GUM Supreme Court case 2023-4

New Florence v. Grand Unified Micronational et al.
14 February 2023

Notice of new action

New Florence v GUM et al.
Case reference: 2023-4
Assigned to Henry Clémens SJ

REGISTRAR: New Florence has brought an action seeking to prohibit the GUM from executively rejecting an applicant on the grounds that its territorial claims conflict with those of another state; additional declarations and orders are also sought.

Petition

Claimant: New Florence (represented by Anthony Clark) Defendant: the GUM; the chair

Facts; relevant law

CLAIMANT: The GUM signed the Edgbaston Convention in June 2019, after consideration by Quorum. The Convention seeks to "prevent frivolous claims of citizenship, territory, and economic activity within the community of small states and nations."

Section 3 of the Convention broadly declares that it is (subject to some exceptions) "improper" to claim territory where the residents are not citizens.

Compliance with the Edgbaston Convention has frequently been used by the chair when deciding whether to executively reject an applicant for GUM membership or observership. Quorum also factors compliance into its decision-making. The Statutes explicitly allow for this, but 1 GUMS 1(4) prohibits the GUM from automatically rejecting an applicant that does not comply with a certain non-GUM international law.

Some delegates object to the GUM admitting states that claim territory that is already claimed by current members. The Edgbaston Convention was in part designed to prevent such conflicting claims.

A delegate recently asked the chair to executively reject an applicant with claims that conflicted with a GUM member. We argue that any such rejection would be unlawful.

Claims

CLAIMANT: The Charter states that micronations are independent sovereign states, and that their sovereignty is inviolable. Any attempt by the GUM (via the Edgbaston Convention or otherwise) to police the territory that a micronation may or may not claim is in violation of this principle. Therefore, the GUM's signature of the Convention, with respect to sections 3 and 4, is unlawful.

The argument that restricting permissible claims is justified because it may prevent other states from having their sovereignty violated is invalid. The violation of sovereignty created by restricting claims is more severe and more immediate than any indirect violation caused because of conflicting claims.

New Florence has standing because it is a GUM member with an interest in the correct application of GUM law.

This complaint does not address the other sections of the Edgbaston Convention; the failure to mention these sections is not a comment on their lawfulness or unlawfulness.

Relief

CLAIMANT: New Florence seeks an order to prohibit any executive rejection on the grounds that an applicant's territory conflicts with another state (member, observer, or not), or for any other reason related to the (non-virtual) territory that an applicant claims.

New Florence seeks an order either rescinding the GUM's signature of sections 3 and 4 of the Edgbaston Convention (or, if the Convention's other provisions are not severable, the entire convention) or, if recission is not possible, a declaration that the GUM's signature of those sections is null and of no effect and an order preventing the GUM from enforcing or promoting those sections in any way.

We seek a declaration stating that (while Quorum is free to reject an applicant on any grounds) any rejection because of an applicant's territorial claims is contrary to the Charter's principles. We seek an order requiring either the chair or director general to inform an applicant rejected on these grounds of this declaration.

We do not seek any orders restricting what may be discussed during Quorum sessions or elsewhere in the GUM, nor any order preventing Quorum from rejecting an applicant on any particular ground.

Judicial review and the pre-action protocol

CLAIMANT: We believe that we are not seeking judicial review, because we are not challenging an already-made decision and, while this action arises because of a potential imminent decision on executive rejection, we are seeking permanent relief that is beyond the chair's authority to authorise (as the chair is only in office for a temporary period).

However, we appreciate that this is a complex issue, and that there are arguments both ways. We are happy to comply with the pre-action protocol if the Court finds that that is required.

Preliminary orders

CLAIMANT: We seek an interim order prohibiting any executive rejection on the grounds of territorial conflict, or for any other reason related to the (non-virtual) territory that an applicant claims, to have force until these claims are concluded. We need the order made as soon as possible, given a potentially imminent decision to executively reject a recent applicant.

Motion for default judgement

4 March 2023

CLAIMANT: Given the GUM’s failure to respond to this action for almost three weeks, New Florence moves for default judgement. If the court does not grant default judgement for any reason, New Florence asks the court to please rule on our motion for a preliminary order as soon as possible. This again was requested nearly three weeks ago, and the court has not responded in any way.

Defendant's response

6 March 2023

DEFENDANT (Chair of the Grand Unified Micronational): This has been a concerning trend this term. As the Advocate General has resigned and a new one not been appointed, I am compelled to respond despite the fact that the Chair has been named as a defendant and the Supreme Justice has not yet responded to this case.

This claim is something that the Chair disagrees both in whole and through its various parts. I shall go through these disagreements point by point.

Signing the Convention

DEFENDANT: When the Edgbaston Convention was first signed by the GUM, as well as the Wrythe Convention, it was made clear that the GUM was signing on behalf of itself as the organization, and not on behalf of its members. Due to the principles of the Charter, the GUM's signature is essentially nonbinding on nonsignatories.

Therefore, on these grounds the case then becomes one of arguing whether the GUM has permission to sign documents as a way of setting formalized guidelines for itself. This is permissible in the Charter.

Restricting Quorum's Rights

DEFENDANT: The claimant is asking explicitly to bar Quorum's sovereign right to refuse states with conflicting claims. This also directly violates the core principles of the Charter. Rejecting candidates with claims directly clashing with those of member states prevents the GUM from effectively trampling on the sovereignty of existing members by admitting those with spurious, unrealistic, nefarious, or ridiculous claims in whole or in part. The claimant then states that Quorum is free to reject applicants for any reason, yet still makes this claim despite. This argument conflicts with itself.

The claimant argues that one violation of sovereignty is more severe than the other is one the Chair also condemns. Violations of sovereignty are violations of sovereignty. The GUM also, in both principle and practice, looks to its own member states first, and prefers them in conflicts of sovereignty. Additionally, the GUM charter is designed to judge applicants on the grounds of existing members' home sovereignty and preferences.

The GUM's Ability to Sign Documents

DEFENDANT: If the Court overturns the GUM's ability to sign the Edgbaston Convention, then all other documents the GUM has or will signed will effectively be on the chopping block. This further endangers the GUM from setting any guidelines Members have the option of binding themselves to, something that further infringes on Member states' sovereign privileges here.

Sovereignty of States

DEFENDANT: The GUM specifically extends the principle of sovereignty to its members. While the Charter states that micronations are sovereign, this extends in principle primarily to its members, and only then leaves the decision to Members to judge whether applicants lay continuous, reasonable, and peaceful claim to sovereignty without placing other Members under any kind of duress.

The Edgbaston Convention is a tool the GUM instituted to aid Quorum on this endeavor. The very idea of restricting Quorum and forcing it to fully recognize the claims of ALL micronations, whether or not they apply for membership, is extremely dangerous and short-sighted.

Judicial Review

DEFENDANT: The decision is already made, and the claimant is asking the Court to blatantly destroy important procedural precedent on what the Chair argues are very loose grounds.

Conclusion

DEFENDANT: The Chair strongly asserts that New Florence's relief would effectively snowball into a situation that may break the back of the GUM's ability to set and enforce standards on potential applicants, therefore neutering it as a capable organization that does anything beyond setting new rules for itself.

This tripartite request bars the Chair from serving Quorum by issuing rejections on applicants that endanger member sovereignty, neuter the GUM's ability both to set and to follow international law, and further restricts members' sovereign rights in direct violation of the Charter. As both the Chair and a delegate, I would very strongly protest and vehemently disagree with such an action.

CLAIMANT: For your information, New Florence intends to file a reply to this answer as soon as possible.

SUPREME JUSTICE CLÉMENS: Thank you for the update.

Claimant's reply

23 April 2023

CLAIMANT: I apologise to the Court and the parties for the delay in filing this reply. We will address each of the respondent's arguments in turn.

Signing the Convention

CLAIMANT: The issue is not that the GUM's signature imposes a legal duty on other parties. The issue is that the GUM's signature leads to a particular practise (i.e. rejecting applicants because of territorial claims) that contravenes the Charter. There is no question that the GUM has the permission to sign agreements, but any such signature must be in accordance with the Charter.

Restricting Quorum's rights

CLAIMANT: We are explicitly not requesting what the respondent says we are. We are seeking to restrict the Executive's powers and to withdraw from certain sections of the Convention, and we are seeking a non-binding declaration that it would contravene the Charter for Quorum to reject an applicant because of its territorial claims. In our complaint, we specified "We do not seek any orders restricting what may be discussed during Quorum sessions or elsewhere in the GUM, nor any order preventing Quorum from rejecting an applicant on any particular ground."

So, we are not seeking to restrict Quorum's powers, and the argument does not "conflict with itself."

The respondent also says that these types of executive rejection are necessary to prevent the GUM "trampling on the sovereignty of existing members." We disagree. We do not view the admittance of a state with a claim conflicting with those of an existing member as a violation of that existing member's sovereignty. If the Court finds that it is a violation, then we argue that the practical damage done by attempting to restrict the claims of those states that aspire to be GUM members is more immediate and severe than the theoretical damage done by having two states in the GUM with conflicting claims.

To explain: a restriction on what territory it is "proper" for a state to claim may actively restrict the territory that a state claims. Having two states with conflicting claims in the GUM does not require either state to do anything; both states can continue to operate however they please. What is more, territorial disputes are common in leading intermacronational organisations – even on Wikipedia, there is a lengthy section detailing the many, many territorial disputes that exist between current UN members and observers (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_territorial_disputes). The respondent goes on to argue that the GUM "in principle and practise, looks to its own members first," and claims that the Charter " is designed to judge applicants on the grounds of existing members' home sovereignty and preferences." But the respondent does not cite any law that says the GUM should give preference to its members' claims, and does not explain which parts of the Charter are designed to do so.

Even if a law existed which required the GUM to give preference to its members' claims, accepting a state with a conflicting claim would not contravene such a law, because doing so would not impose any practical impediment on the member in question.

The GUM's ability to sign documents

CLAIMANT: The respondent's claim that rescinding the GUM's signature of the Convention would put other conventions "on the chopping block" is baseless. There is no risk of this slippery slope occurring – the GUM's signature of the Edgbaston Convention is only being called into question because it contravenes the Charter. The GUM is obviously free to sign any agreement that it wishes, provided that doing so does not violate the Charter. This is a non-argument.

Sovereignty of states

CLAIMANT: The respondent claims "while the Charter states that micronations are sovereign, this extends in principle primarily to its members." But this argument has no basis in the law, and is in fact contradicted by the Charter's wording.

The Charter says "Micronations, including the GUM’s members, are independent sovereign states. [emphasis added]" If this provision was meant only to apply to members, then there would be no need to explicitly include them. The emphasised text is only there because the provision is meant to apply to all states, not just members.

The respondent goes on to argue that "restricting Quorum and forcing it to fully recognize the claims of all micronations ... is extremely dangerous and short-sighted." First, as detailed above, we are not seeking to restrict Quorum in any way. There is perhaps an argument that Quorum should be prevented from rejecting applicants on the basis of their territorial claims, but this goes beyond the relief we are seeking, and we leave it to the Court to decide if a more extensive order to this effect is warranted.

Second, while we are seeking orders and declarations that amount to a fundamental recognition of all micronational claims, we disagree that this is dangerous or short-sighted. Subject to the relief we request, Quorum would still be free to accept or reject applicants as it pleases. Nothing in our complaint would require the GUM to accept any state as a member.

Judicial review

CLAIMANT: The respondent does not give any actual reason for challenging our arguments regarding the pre-action protocol. Nonetheless, we are happy to expand on these arguments if the Court requests.

Conclusion

CLAIMANT: We have nothing further to add, and believe that all claims asserted by the respondent under this section are already addressed by our responses above. But again, we are happy to expand on our arguments if the Court requests. This concludes our reply.

Advocate-General's first reply

23 April 2023

Signing the Convention

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: As previously said, the charter clearly mentions the fact that aspiring members must be sovereign (to put it simply, they must have absolute control over territory). The Edgbaston Convention, however, states that nations should not claim as territory any inhabited areas where the majority of residents are not citizens, except for purely ceremonial claims. Thus, the aspiring states' claiming of territory that is inhabited and controlled by non-citizens, alongside "ceremonial claims" are against the current charter.

Restricting Quorum's rights

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: First of all, the charter clearly states that any applicant that is eligible and does indeed apply has to be accepted by quorum through a vote. The GUM Statutes mentions that "The chair or supreme justice must promptly reject an applicant if they are not eligible. The chair, supreme justice, or safeguarding officer must promptly reject an applicant if their membership would likely create a safeguarding risk. The chair may reject an applicant if the chair thinks it near-certain that the membership will not approve the application or for any other reason determined by Quorum. The supreme justice may reject an applicant if they’ve been found in contempt of the Supreme Court within the last year. An applicant may only be rejected under subsection (a) before voting begins; but may be rejected for any other reason even if voting has begun.

Second of all, in the GUM charter, Article 3, paragraph 3, it is clearly stated that "The GUM encourages the peaceful resolution of disputes and condemns micronational war." Thus according to the charter, the organization does not disallow territorial disputes between states, but merely discourages it.

The GUM's ability to sign documents

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: According to my observations, it is true that the Edgbaston convention does contradict the charter. I believe it is an issue of the charter being vague on certain aspects of sovereignity and statehood.

Sovereignty of states

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: It is indeed true that the ultimate rejection of applicant members is done via vote by the Quorum. Any kind of territorial disputes or claiming can be discussed in said Quorum.

Conclusion

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: I apologize for the short responses, I am open to answer any more questions at a later date.

CLAIMANT: If the GUM's standard for sovereignty is "absolute control" over territory, then all current members must be expelled. No GUM member holds absolute control over its territory, because ultimately a macronation also has control. And if a conflict with a powerful macronation is permissible to the GUM, then why is a conflict with an almost-certainly far less powerful micronation an issue? If the GUM agrees with us that the Edgbaston Convention contradicts the Charter, will it then agree to the relief requested in our complaint?

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: Yes. That is true. I suppose the GUM's definition of sovereignity is different. The charter should be more in depth about this. I suppose member states should have a respectable amount of influence and de facto control. I believe the requested relief is acceptable. Rejection of applicants should ultimately be done in quorum, after in-depth discussion between delegates and a vote. However, it is true the Chair can reject any applicant under specific circumstances, according to the Charter.

CLAIMANT: So, how to proceed? Do we continue to judgement, or can we perhaps draft and sign a settlement agreement? If the latter, I'm not sure who would be authorised to sign such an agreement. The chair? Quorum? The AG?

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: I believe we should settle on an agreement so we do not extend the issue longer than it has already been. But yes, I don't know the answer to the last question. I propose we patiently wait for the chair to voice an opinion on the matter.

CLAIMANT: If we draft a settlement agreement, I presume it will go before Quorum for signature? Or should we simply ask the Court to enter a judgement? It might be simpler?

ACTING SUPREME JUSTICE VALENTINUS: This action has been reassigned to the Deputy Supreme Justice, James Bornstein.

DEFENDANT (Chair of the Grand Unified Micronational): I'll wait for the Court's recommendation before proceeding.

DEPUTY SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: I have looked over the entire case. I ask that the parties attempt to settle on an agreement, and I would say that Quorum would be authorized to sign such an agreement if one is able to be reached. If an agreement is unable to be reached over the next seven days, we can proceed from there.

CLAIMANT: New Florence will enter into negotiations promptly.

Draft settlement agreement

3 May 2023

CLAIMANT: New Florence proposes the following draft settlement agreement:

This is a settlement agreement (‘the Agreement’) in the case New Florence v GUM et al. (2023-4), currently pending before the GUM Supreme Court.

The Agreement is between New Florence (‘the claimant’) and the GUM (‘the respondent’) (‘the parties’).

In this Agreement, a reference to the GUM includes a reference to its officers and employees in their official capacity.

The parties agree as follows:

1. The GUM’s signature of sections 3 and 4 of the Edgbaston Convention is unlawful, because it conflicts with 1 GUMC 3(1). Therefore, the GUM’s signature of these sections is null, void, and of no effect. The GUM is prohibited from enforcing or promoting these sections in any way.
2. The GUM and its officers are prohibited from executively rejecting any applicant for membership or observership on the ground that the applicant’s territorial claims conflict with the claims of any other state (be they a member, observer, or neither). This includes any executive rejection on the ground that members are likely to reject the applicant because of conflicting territorial claims.
3. If Quorum rejects an applicant, and discussions in Quorum make it evident that an important reason for rejection was that the applicant’s territorial claims conflict with the claims of another state, the GUM must—
   

a)inform the applicant of these discussions;
b) inform the applicant that rejecting an applicant for these reasons is contrary to the Charter;
c) inform the applicant of their right to seek judicial review of the rejection.

1. Sections 2 and 3 do not apply if there are particular and extraordinary circumstances surrounding the applicant’s territorial claims that make them unsuited for membership (e.g. if it can be shown that the applicant has claimed the territory of a member as a hostile act).
2. New Florence acknowledges that Quorum may never be compelled to accept an applicant. But New Florence and the GUM agree that—
   

a) Quorum’s decisions, including decisions regarding membership and observership, are always subject to judicial review and
b) the Supreme Court may quash a membership or observership decision and require Quorum to make the decision again.

1. New Florence will immediately withdraw their claims in the action New Florence v GUM et al. (2023-4).
2. This Agreement sets out the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes all prior statements or representations.
3. The Agreement has effect in perpetuity, even if, in the future, New Florence is no longer a member. A party may withdraw from this agreement only with the consent of the other party.
4. The Agreement may not be varied unless with the consent of both parties.
5. If any part of the Agreement is held to be illegal, invalid, or unenforceable, in whole or in part, such part will no longer form part of the Agreement, but the legality, validity, or enforceability of the remainder of the Agreement will not be affected.
6. This Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with GUM law, and the parties agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the GUM Supreme Court in relation to any claim arising from this Agreement.
7. Both parties waive their rights under 12 GUMS 3(2)(e) (without prejudice privilege) in relation to this Agreement.

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: Thank you. The Court awaits the response of the Advocate-General.

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: After my review of the document, I can voice the fact that I fully support this proposed settlement agreement.

Amicus Curiae (Adammia)

4 May 2023

ADAM I: Your Honour, the Empire of Adammia begs leave to enter the following amicus curiae brief:

HM IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LEGAL DEPARTMENT

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
New Florence v. Grand Unified Micronational et al.

The Empire of Adammia hereby enters the following amicus curiae brief regarding GUM court case 2023-4. Adammia makes the following arguments:

With regards to Chapter 1 Article 3 (2) of the GUM Charter, whilst it is stated that all states are equal regardless of geographic characteristics, the Charter goes on to state: “However, every state is also unique, and sometimes there will be a legitimate reason to treat states differently. For example, this section doesn’t oblige the GUM to offer membership to every state that requests it.” We note that the Charter explicitly names membership applications as an area in which states may be treated differently. We posit that if, as Plaintiff argues, states may not be rejected on the basis of their geographical characteristics, then states also cannot be rejected under any of the other characteristics listed under Article 3 (2). This would lead to, for the sake of example, the following logical conclusions:

• Due to equality regardless of political characteristics, the GUM would not be able to reject states on the grounds of political extremism, such as neo-Nazi micronations.
• Due to equality regardless of perceived reputation, the GUM would not be able to reject states on the grounds of suspected fraud. By the same argument as Plaintiff makes, the GUM’s signature of the Wrythe Convention should be rescinded on the grounds that it discriminates against the “Kingdom of Catan”.

Chapter 2 Article 1 (1) (d) clearly establishes that the Quorum can set its own eligibility requirements, and in authorising the signature of the Edgbaston Convention it exercised this authority.

Furthermore, Chapter 1 Article 5 (4) of the GUM Charter states that “No one may be held liable under GUM law (judicially or otherwise) for any act or omission which wouldn’t have made them liable when it was done.” We argue that this clause applies to all parties, including the GUM itself. The Grand Unified Micronational signed the Edgbaston Convention on 28 June 2019, whereas the sections of the Charter that Plaintiff is using to argue this case were only adopted on 21 March 2021. We argue that it is unreasonable and undemocratic to, rather than simply call a vote in Quorum on rescinding the signature of the Convention, instead introduce Charter amendments that create the potential for the signature to be retroactively revoked by court order, essentially acting to rescind the GUM’s signature via the back door.

With regards to Title 1 Chapter 1 (4) of the GUM Statutes, whilst it is true that the Edgbaston Convention cannot create any binding bar to membership, this section goes on to specifically state that: “an applicant’s adherence to any international law may be considered when making a decision under section 3” (referring to early executive rejection). Member states are presumably within their rights to ask that the Chair make such a consideration. The fact of the matter is that the particular practice of rejecting applicants because of territorial claims that violate the Edgbaston Convention is permitted because the Charter explicitly states that this “may be considered”. We would also argue that, even if this section of the Statutes prevented an international treaty from creating standards by which the Chair should evaluate applicants when deciding whether or not to reject them, then the section would contravene Chapter 2 Article 1 (1) (d) of the GUM Charter, which explicitly allows for Quorum to set its own eligibility criteria, and is a higher authority than the Statutes.

We would argue that it is logical that a membership application should always be executive rejected if it already meets the general grounds for expelling a member under Chapter 2 Article 4 (1) of the Charter. Clause (a) of that section specifically allows for a member state to be expelled for violating international law – which would reasonably include the Edgbaston Convention – and so an applicant must surely be rejected on the same grounds. Meanwhile, clause (c) allows a member state to be expelled if they present an immediate threat to the GUM’s reputation or stability. Nations with outrageous geographic claims of the type that the Edgbaston Convention seeks to prevent would plainly threaten the GUM’s reputation, and there is even a fairly recent historical example of this. In May 2019, the GUM was ridiculed in the wider micronational community after accepting an an observer the Empire of Lehmark, which (unbeknownst to the organisation) at that time claimed the entire Earth. Vast territorial claims of the kind that are likely to overlap with the established territories of member states, prevented by the Edgbaston Convention, also plainly threaten the GUM’s stability, and again there is a historical example for this – the tension between Mercia and Essexia over the nature of the latter’s claims at the time of their admittance to the organisation. The Edgbaston Convention clearly serves to prevent the admission of member states that would immediately become liable for expulsion.

We further note that an early executive rejection on the grounds of violating the Edgbaston Convention does not unfairly prevent a state from accessing the application process. It is not a difficult bar to surpass to get three member states to petition to overturn such a rejection; if an applicant is not even capable of finding three member states willing to do this, then it is self-evident that the Chair was justified in issuing an executive rejection on the grounds that the applicant would almost certainly be rejected by Quorum. A reasonable first recourse for Plaintiff in the case of the rejection of the “Third French Empire” would have been to make such a petition before bringing this case to the Court, but they have not done so as far as we are aware.

With regards to statements made by Plaintiff in court regarding sovereignty, we note that although it is possible for two current UN member states to have territorial disputes, prospective UN applicants will typically experience barriers in joining the UN if they have a territorial dispute with a current member (see for example Kosovo, or the Republic of China). Indeed, the UN would argue that the reason why they don’t allow micronation to join is because they have not established full territorial independence from their host UN member state. The GUM can presumably apply a similar standard. In fact, the GUM is far more able to expel member states for aggressively claiming the territory of another member than the UN is. If (hypothetically, for the sake of argument) a GUM member state spoke even in the terms of rhetoric towards another member state that the “Russian Federation” has towards Ukraine, even disregarding any real violence, it would surely be expelled. In practical terms, the GUM should actually be in a stronger position than the UN for guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its member states from the claims of prospective applicants and other members alike.

Fundamentally, Chapter 1 Article 2 (1) of the GUM Charter states that the members of the GUM are independent sovereign states. In the instance of the “Third French Empire” which triggered this case, their claims clashed with the Colony of Xanada, which is sovereign Adammic territory. It is intolerable to us that the Quorum might entertain the possibility of admitting such an applicant, as to do so would, in the eyes of the micronational world and the general public, elevate their claim to the same dignity as our sovereign territory. The mere risk of such a thing being allowed to happen is potentially injurious to us and we have every right, as a sovereign nation as the Charter confirms, to ask that the Chair consider making a rejection on the grounds of the applicant failing to adhere to international law. To bring our argument full circle, that international law – the Edgbaston Convention – is not contrary to the Charter, because the Charter makes it clear that states may be treated differently for the purposes of membership applications.

We hope that is clarifies our position on this case. Our thanks to the Kingdom of Wyvern, who have assisted us in the writing of this brief.

ENTERED INTO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE GRAND UNIFIED MICRONATIONAL ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MAY TWO-THOUSAND AND TWENTY-THREE.

Adams Primus Imperator

His Imperial Majesty Emperor Adam I
Primary Delegate for the Empire of Adammia

CLAIMANT: New Florence intends to submit a reply to this brief at the earliest opportunity.

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: Thank you, I will look through this when I get the chance later today. [to the Advocate-General] Is this still the case?

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: No. As I have stated in ⁠foyer I no longer support the settlement. I apologize for the misunderstanding.

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: So will we be continuing with the goal of a ruling?

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: I suppose so. Apparently the chair is preparing something, I suggest we wait for that to be done.

Amicus Curiae (Zenrax)

Office of the Emperor of Zenrax

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF OPINION TO THE GUM SUPREME COURT

New Florence v. Grand Unified Micronational et al.

SHIRO MEPHISTOPHELES: The Emperor of Zenrax, acting on behalf of the Imperial Federation of Zenrax, hereby enters the following statement of opinion regarding GUMSC case #2023-4. Our arguments are in support of the amicus curae brief submitted by our friends the Empire of Adammia, with additions of our own.

To begin, we file this statement as the delegation from the Imperial Federation of Zenrax to the Grand Unified Micronational, and not as the Chair of the same organization. We further acknowledge that obligations as a delegate and as Chair of the Grand Unified Micronational (a.k.a. “the GUM”), can and do diverge from one another. Actions taken as Chair are ostensibly on behalf of the GUM, and any actions taken are subject to Quorum’s orders. The possible range of actions that should be legally taken are well-laid, and in complete accordance with our view of the Empire of Adammia’s statements regarding the legal nature of office of the Chair, and what the Quorum should be legally allowed in their actions. As such, Zenrax’s arguments rest elsewhere.

Firstly, Zenrax states its agreement with Adammia that the GUM Charter strongly states that all members hold sovereignty and that this is to be treated equally. However, Zenrax echoes Adammia’s argument that the equality clause has limits. These limits include (and are not limited to) ensuring that applicants’ sovereignty meets the Charter’s minimal requirements (provided elsewhere). Additionally, the “equal protection” clauses of the Charter do not extend to the “stability and reputation clause” (cited also by Adammia). Therefore, Zenrax argues that the equality rules do not extend to Quorum’s right to determine matters of membership in regards to their use of or existence of sovereign claims, nor do equality rules impact Quorum’s assessment of applicants’ effect on the GUM and its proceedings. Sovereignty and “sovereign claims” is one of several aspects of a member state that Quorum must consider. Depriving Quorum of this tool would impede on its own sovereign decision-making rights, as well as impede its ability to act in upholding and protecting the GUM’s “good order, stability, and reputation” as is its duty.

Secondly, Zenrax revisits the difference between the GUM’s ability to take action based on Edgbastion, in relation to Quorum’s rights to take action or inaction, either individually or collectively. The Edgbaston treaty, when put into force by the Quorum in 2019, was done with the tacit approval by the Court in July 2019 that it was not in violation of the Charter, but this faced the individual sovereignty of the states in taking action. That is, the GUM’s signature of the convention was not enforceable on its members, but that signatories or the GUM Staff could use the document as reference for making membership decisions based on Quorum’s consent. This was paired with the ability to challenge executive rejection for any reason, whether by signatories or non-signatories, for any reason Member States may or may not cite in doing so. Should the provisions of this document be seen to be misused, Quorum would have multiple opportunities to successfully challenge executive rejection. Zenrax notes that this has not once been the case in terms of rejections based on spurious territorial claims. This is practice-based proof that the treaty applies to the GUM, and its officers specifically, not to Quorum’s individual members. Therefore, the existence of the treaty and the use of executive rejection rules adds to the document having no binds on Quorum’s right to take actions on membership as it pleases.

Thirdly, Zenrax iterates Adammia’s statement that the Quorum is explicitly sovereign, as our its Member States. Both the equal protection clauses and membership clauses reinforce this fact. The existence of multiple avenues to challenge GUM Staff is further proof of this reality. Therefore, given both the arguments above and Adammia’s own eloquently worded statements, prove Quorum’s ability to reject undesirable applicants and give itself access to tools it may collectively ask GUM Staff to aid its process in doing so. Therefore, striking this down is beyond the Court’s power and beyond its purview, as it would be unilaterally be declaring parts of the Charter itself null and void.

Fourthly, a strong social contract exists as implied by Charter Law between the GUM, the collective Quorum, and its individual members. That is, the GUM is a voluntary association where ultimate (legislative) supremacy on membership is given wholly to Quorum. This creates the bedrock of the social contract the GUM enjoys with members to this day. Behavioral standards exist in the Charter for protection of the organization, imposed by Quorum when the Charter was written. Given the absolute terms given in the Charter on Quorum’s sovereignty and the protection of members’ own sovereignty in turn, the GUM is powerless to compel member states into action or inaction except through enforcement of good conduct and other standards of membership listed in the Charter. Therefore, the Court unilaterally forbidding member states from using their own internal policies to take action or inaction on membership matters is an extremely dangerous proposition that would also grossly violate this social contract.

While other arguments outside of this set in relation to the Chair and other GUM Offices, Zenrax maintains that Adammia set these out in adequate detail and sufficient strength. The arguments of Zenrax are best crystallized and concluded in Adammia’s words: “It is intolerable to us that the Quorum might entertain the possibility of admitting such an applicant, as to do so would, in the eyes of the micronational world and the general public, elevate their claim to the same dignity as our sovereign territory. The mere risk of such a thing being allowed to happen is potentially injurious to us and we have every right, as a sovereign nation as the Charter confirms, to ask that the Chair consider making a rejection on the grounds of the applicant failing to adhere to international law.” Zenrax echoes these words, and argues that part of both its own duty as a member state, and its duty while its delegation holds the office of Chair, is to use tools given by Quorum to uphold the GUM’s reasonable standards for membership.

Signed on May 4th, 2023:

Shiro Mephistopheles

Emperor of Zenrax,
Delegate of Zenrax to the GUM

CLAIMANT: It feels like proceeding to a ruling makes the most sense. We need the Court to settle what the law in this area is. New Florence will have a detailed submission to make in response to the three amicus curiae briefs, but this may take me a little time to prepare.

Amicus Curiae (Wyvern)

BRADLEY OF DULLAHAN: To the Supreme Justice and the Supreme Court of the Grand Unified Micronational

Amicus Curiae brief
2023-4 New Florence v. Grand Unified Micronational et al.

His Majesty’s Government of the Kingdom of Wyvern hereby wishes to enter the following amicus curiae brief regarding the above mentioned case:

GUM law and principles of the organisation

In 2019 the Grand Unified Micronational co-created and adopted as an original signatory party the Edgbaston Convention. With this it can be reasonably seen that the treaty is not non-GUM international law but part of the GUM international law. In this the argument made by the claimant that it is not an integral part of the GUM is false. The statement that this convention is part of the very identity of the GUM can be seen specifically in the multitudes of application in deciding on memberships.

The GUM has always strived for a professional and serious intermicronational organisation, by making outrageous claims, claim land, citizens or fictional territory showcases that the applicant isn’t serious and does not comply with the principles of the GUM. Though this specific principle is no longer written in the letter of the law it has always been a guiding principle of the GUM throughout the years of its existence. Thus it is a convention of the organisation, which is normally part of the rules of the organisation.

Membership and eligibility

Though it's true what the claimant says that 2 GUMS 1(2) bars the GUM from applying international law to which the GUM is a party as a binding guarantee for membership and also to bar someone from membership, we would counter that two other rules overrule this part of the Statutory Code.

1 GUMC 7 (1)(d) states that international treaties and conventions to which the GUM is a party is a viable source of law and is binding GUM law. Thus it proves that the claimants claim that this convention is non-GUM international law is simply wrong and that it is appliable in the GUM, and we would even argue enforcable.

We would also argue that 2 GUMS 1(2) violates the principle of Quorum to set eligibility for membership as is written in 2 GUMC 1(1)(d). This article of the charter specifically states that to be eligible to become a member of the Grand Unified Micronational one has to meet the eligibility requirements set by the Quorum of Delegates. By signing the Edgbaston Convention and applying it in various membership votes and rejections, the Quorum has specifically stated that it sees this as such a requirement for membership. 1 GUMC 7 (1) clearly states that in the hierarchy of binding law the Charter is above all else and thus nullifies 2 GUMS 1(2).

Not a violation of their sovereignty

The claimant claims that the GUM cannot enforce the convention as this would go against 1 GUMC 3 (1)(c) (sovereignity), we would counter that this is false and would lead to a dangerous consequences if the GUM ruled this way. It is commonly understood that to be a member of the Gum a nation requires to comply with the Charter and GUM law, which sometimes includes international law. Let me give an example: - It is a sovereign act of any nation to wage war. However internationally it has been deemed illegal to wage a war of aggression. The GUM through international treaties against micronational war condemns war and has named in the charter under 1 GUM 3 (3) peace as a principle of the organisation. In this scenario a nation may breach the charter because doing so is a sovereign act of foreign policy of a member state. This is ludicrous and the claimant should know better.

We would further counter that the charter clearly gives the GUM the right to enforce this Convention as seen in the following parts of the charter:

• 1 GUMC 7 (1)(d) establishes international treaties where the GUM is a party to as binding GUM law;
• GUMC 4(a) grants the GUM the right to expel a member that ‘’has egregiously or persistently violated the Charter, the Statutes, or other international law’’, showcases that violating the charter (and by extension the principles named in the charter) and international law or any GUM law can be grounds for expulsion. This does not limit a nations sovereignty, it just limits their capacity to be a member of this organisation.
• 2 GUMC 4(b) gives the GUM the right to move to remove a member because it hurts the reputation or stability of the GUM. By allowing members with overlapping or fictitious or outrageous claims to join the GUM is asking for instability because of conflicts between members and it harms our reputation as a serious organisation;
• 2 GUMC 4(d) is the most important of them all, it clearly showcases that if a nation does not comply with the objectives and principles of this organisation they can be removed. Thus it can be argued, again, that membership is not part of the sovereign right of every nation’s foreign policy and that for continued membership a nation has to comply with our principles, charter and international law.

Conclusion

Considering the above mentioned arguments His Majesty’s Government has come to the conclusion that the convention in question is applicable in GUM law, is GUM law, is per the charter an eligibility requirement for membership. Thus the rejection made by the administration on grounds of said convention is by very definition lawful. Furthermore we wish to add that the rejection would have been legal anyway, regardless of the convention because the Quorum can reject an applicant for any reason they deem fit. Including overlapping claims and non-compliance of GUM conventions as it demonstrates that they are not serious, professional etc. The rejection by the administration is to prevent unnecessary time being wasted on nations who Quorum would not let into the organisation in the first place.

We hope the Supreme Court will come to the same conclusion we have.

Yours sincerely,
In name of His Imperial & Royal Majesty, the King of Wyvern,

His Grace, Bradley, the Duke of Dullahan,
Prime-minister of the Kingdom of Wyvern

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: I have three documents to still review thoroughly and a fourth once New Florence submits a submission. Once this occurs, I’d like to ask a few questions for both parties. Thank you again to all parties that have helped me by proving briefs.

Alright. I have looked through all of these. Before I move on with responding to them and while I await New Florence’s response, I have a question for @Advocate General. Mr. Snagoveanu, despite representing Grand Unified Micronational, which is being sued in this case, you have essentially agreed with all but everything New Florence has argued. I understand this was due to a misconception in your role about this case leading you to represent your own personal views, and I do not intend to factor your statements then into my decision. That being said, since you haven’t had the chance to truly defend GUM, I would like to give you that chance, and I am asking for an opening statement of sorts defending the view of the organization rather than your own.

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: Yes, I will do it in a couple hours from now.

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: Fantastic, thank you.

Advocate-General's second reply

5 May 2023

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: As I am representing the organization, every opinion of mine should be what is directly helpful/preferable to the organization and should at the same time be correct according to the charter and statutes.

Signing the Convention

I concur with the chair. The organisation itself signed the two treaties and, according to the charter, it is true that states/organizations which have not signed any of the two treaties cannot be forced to follow their principles, until applying for membership, of course.

Restricting Quorum's rights

The GUM, in principle, holds itself as one of the biggest, most influential and most well-known micronational organisations. The GUM must be careful when accepting new members, and this includes checking their claimed territory, and whether it is reasonable or not. A micronation could, in theory, lay claim on lands which well-established micronations have already claimed/have significant influence. In that case, It's only right that quorum can vote to directly reject any applicants in any case.

The GUM's ability to sign documents

It is true that by overturning the signing of the Edgbaston, most if not all of the organization's documents must also be overturned and new ones created. I concur with the chair.

Sovereignty of States

Yes, members of the GUM should judge any applicant, including judging their territorial claims to see if they are fit for the organization or not (for example, extraordinarry claims in outer space, etc.) and if they violate the claimed territory of any other member state.

Conclusion

I fully support the chair's arguments, all of them proving to be correct, legal according to the charter, and helpful to the organization itself.

I've added everything in this document so it is easier to store. I apologize for the short statements, I decided to not go very in-depth and answer questions directly here, if needed.

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: Thank you. Correct me if I am mistaken, but I assume that you disagree with New Florence that the Charter saying that micronations are sovereign with inviolable sovereignty means that Sections 3 and 4 of the Convention are unlawful. If this is the case, can you tell me why?

ADVOCATE-GENERAL SNAGOVEANU: I apologize, as you may know we live on opposite sides of the world, so I was sleeping during this time. I will reply to your question very soon. For context, these are sections 3 and 4 of the convention:

• 3. It is deemed improper for a nation-state to claim as its territory:
  
  • a. Any inhabited area in which a majority of the permanent residents, or a majority of the people who work there, are not citizens of the nation-state or family of citizens of the nation-state within three generations; or
  • b. Any inhabited area in which no permanent resident is a citizen of the nation-state;
• 4. The exceptions to section 3 are:
  • a. Claims over territory that are purely titular and ceremonial, and are clearly specified as being such;
  • b. Claims over areas of terra nullius, such as Antarctica and Bir Tawil; and
  • c. Claims which would have been proper at the time they were originally established, but have since entered a state where they might be considered improper in the present.

The charter's notes on sovereignty are as follows:

Sovereignty— Micronations, including the GUM’s members, are independent sovereign states. Their sovereignty is inviolable. The GUM must not—

• impose GUM membership on a state without its consent,
• prevent a state from leaving the GUM, or
• restrict a state’s ability to control its domestic or foreign affairs.

The charter does not have an in-depth description of what "sovereignty" means in the GUM. When the organization signed the Edgbaston Convention, the sovereignty requirements became more clear. That said, the sections 3 and 4 of the convention are not unlawful according to the charter, we can consider the convention to be merely an extension of the charter's sovereignty section.

Reassignment

30 April 2023

New Florence v GUM et al.
Case reference: 2023-4
Assigned to Bornstein DSJ

ACTING SUPREME JUSTICE VALENTINUS: Following the resignation of Supreme Justice Clémens, New Florence v GUM et al has been reassigned to Deputy Supreme Justice James Bornstein.

Dismissal

15 May 2023

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: Mr. Clark, will New Florence continue this case prior to its departure?

17 May 2023

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: Mr. Clark, I would really appreciate confirmation when you can since I intend to dismiss it immediately if you withdraw.

CLAIMANT: Yes, New Florence no longer plans to pursue this case. It can be dismissed.

Notice of dismissal

New Florence v GUM et al.
Case reference: 2023-4
Assigned to Bornstein SJ

SUPREME JUSTICE BORNSTEIN: I hereby move to dismiss these cases without prejudice. This is because the claimant has withdrawn their claim. I would like to apologize for forgetting to dismiss this case earlier due to many things in my personal life, which has lead it to be technically ongoing for much longer than I intended. As this has been dismissed with prejudice, the claimants may not bring this case back to court. Case is dismissed.